Co-regulation and voluntarism in the provision of food safety: lessons from institutional economics by Hussain, Salman
LAND ECONOMY WORKING PAPER SERIES
___________________________________________________________________
Number 9. Co-regulation and voluntarism in the provision of food safety: 
lessons from institutional economics
Corresponding Author:
Salman Hussain





E-Mail:  Salman.Hussain@sac.ac.ukCo-regulation and voluntarism in the provision of food safety: lessons from institutional economics
Salman Hussain
Abstract
Traditional regulation in the food safety domain has been in the form of mandatory, inflexible food safety 
controls that are applied to firms.  There has been a trend away from this regulatory paradigm towards 
more  co-regulation  and  self-regulation  by  industry.  This  paper  investigates  the  potential  for  systemic 
failure in the provision of safe food that might arise as a consequence of this new regulatory paradigm. 
These systemic failures occur owing to the fact that the food safety outcome depends on the behaviour of 
the three sets of agents (firms, consumers and the regulator).  These populations of agents have generally 
been treated in the literature as homogeneous in terms of their behaviour and strategies. Further, the 
actions taken by any one agent are assumed to be independent of those taken by others. The institutional 
economics model that is developed assumes heterogeneity and inter-agent strategic interactions. Given this 
(more realistic) depiction of behaviour, instances of potential regulatory inefficiencies arise . In particular, 
the model challenges the trend towards voluntarism and self-regulation. 
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The regulatory status quo for the food industry around much of the developed world might be characterised 
as inflexible, mandatory, ex ante regulation of product safety for firms, including both food producers and 
distributors/handlers.  There is a range within this regulatory type (which I term ‘traditional regulation’) 
from prior approval through to the designation of different standards, the latter being more flexible forms of 
regulatory intervention.  Traditional regulation imposes significant compliance costs on firms.   
The remit of regulatory bodies has evolved to include cost-benefit appraisal of regulatory intervention. This 
has in part stimulated the interest both in the academic literature (e.g. Fearne and Garcia Martinez, 2005; 
Unnevehr and Jensen, 1999; Roe, 2004) and in empirical public regulation of the potential to find more 
economically efficient alternatives.  One strand of alternatives to traditional regulation is what has been 
termed ‘co-regulation’ wherein a greater reliance is made on self-regulation by firms and their associated 
industry bodies.  In a similar vein, there is the potential to tap into consumers’ self-interested behaviour on 
the demand side, i.e. consumers are expected to make a greater contribution to the food safety outcome 
through their behaviour.  
The probability of a foodborne illness incident arising depends on the behaviour of three agents, i.e. the 
firm, the consumer and the regulator, and the institutional context for their decisions, e.g. the accessibility 
to and efficacy of the legal system, cultural norms and values and the types of food consumed. The ‘firm’ 
in this case is a string of agents in the supply chain.  Firms can reduce risks in home-prepared food by 
reducing pathogen levels in raw inputs by screening, by stunting pathogen growth through altering product 
formulation (e.g. by changing pH) and by slowing pathogen growth by quality assurance in the handling 
and storage of food in the distribution chain (Roe, 2004).  Consumers affect risk through their food storage, 
handling and cooking methods.  Consumer awareness and concern with regard to foodborne illness has 
burgeoned over the past two decades owing to several high profile incidences of contaminations.  Although 
consumers state that their awareness of appropriate food safety handling procedures has risen (Fein, 2001), 
Daniels et al. (2001) report that three-quarters of consumers continue to make critical food handling and 
preparation errors that increase the risk of a foodborne illness incident arising. The  standard  economic  principle  of  equi-marginal  returns  to  effort  (e.g.  Edwards-Jones  et  al,  2000) 
provides a rationale for this shift from traditional regulation to co-regulatory alternatives.  This principle 
states that, in order for an outcome to be economically efficient, the last unit of effort expended by each 
agent to increase food security should realise the same given reduction in food risk.  The agents in this case 
are the populations of firms and consumers and the regulator. Firms voluntarily participating in a quality 
assurance scheme or consumers adapting their food handling procedures (owing to an awareness-raising 
campaign) might achieve a given reduction in food risk at a lower cost than traditional regulation. 
Although  this  rationale  for  regulatory  alternatives  appears  reasonable,  I  would  argue  that  it  does  not 
sufficiently  account  for the  fact  that  the achievement  of  food  safety depends  on  strategic  interactions.  
These interactions occur both within the populations of agents (e.g. firms’ strategic responses with respect 
to the behaviour of other firms) and across these populations (e.g. consumers reactions to changes in the 
institutional  framework  set  by  the  regulator).    These  interactions  are  all  the  more  complex  when  the 
standard  (and  unrealistic,  arbitrary)  assumption  that  the  populations  of  firms  and  consumers  are 
homogeneous in their strategies and behaviour is no longer applied.  The aim of this paper is to draw out 
these  strategic  interactions  and  to  consider  the  resulting  potential  for  systemic  failure  in  food  safety 
provision.    In  essence,  this  research  questions  whether  the  regulatory  paradigm  shift  is  economically 
efficient given what is known (and what can be inferred and drawn from) the strategic behavioural and 
institutional economics literatures.    
In  order  to  achieve  this  aim,  the  paper  has  the  following  structure.    In  the  next  section,  I  develop  a 
diagrammatic  schematic  framework  for  the  analysis  of  food  safety  vis-à-vis  the  strategic  interactions 
between  the  population  of  agents.    At  this  stage  of  the  analysis,  homogeneity  is  assumed  across  the 
population  of  agents.  This  assumption  is  relaxed  in  the  section  that  follows  where  the  subsets  of  the 
populations are described and the interaction between these subsets is modelled.  This model adapts the 
typology of systemic risk in Hennessy et al. (2003) to account for interactions between sub-populations.  
The final section then provides a synthesis of these theoretical discussions and a policy summary.A schematic representation of food safety 
Consider  Figure  1.  I  begin  with  the  assumption  that  there  are  homogeneous  populations  of  firms  and 
consumers that affect the safety of one particular sample of a given commercially marketed food product. 
Note  that  these  are  discreet  subsets  of  the  entire  populations  of  firms  and  consumers.    Further,  these 
discreet subsets may only contain one element, e.g. one consumer.  Each firm in the (food safety) chain is 
assumed to be a profit-maximiser and each consumer a utility-maximiser.  These agents take actions that 
are contained within activity sets.  For the population of firms, these activity sets are  as follows: raw 
material selection; processing; storage; handling; distribution.  For the population of consumers, they are as 
follows: food storage; handling; preparation.  Each activity set can contain actions carried out by more than 
one agent in the respective populations (e.g. two different firms take actions in the ‘handling’ activity).  
Further, one agent can be responsible for multiple actions within one activity (e.g. two areas within the 
production process of the same firm that affect ‘handling’). 
Figure 1 A schematic representation of food security 
It is assumed in the first instance that the activities are independent, i.e. one firm’s procedures in terms of, 
say, food handling neither affect nor are affected by any other agent’s behaviour.  Further, it is assumed 
that the regulator sets the institutional and legal context for the actions taken by firms and consumers.  The 
regulator affects food safety outcomes through its role in influencing the expected private payoffs to the 
competing options made by these agents.
In Figure 1, the sets F and C respectively represent ‘safe processes’.  PFSI represents the overall probability 
of a foodborne safety incident arising at the point of consumption, i.e. after all the actions have been taken 
by the populations of firms and consumers.  Note that PFSI depends not only on the activities of the agents 
but also on the susceptibility of the consumer to illness.  For instance, the likelihood of a contaminated food 
sample causing an illness incident is higher ceteris paribus if this sample is consumed by an elderly person 
with a weak immune system as compared with consumption by a younger, healthier individual.If any action has an associated PFSI:PFSI>0 then this action is outside the ‘safe processes’ sets.  The further 
this element is from F, C the higher is probability PFSI.  Thus the PFSI associated with FS2 is larger than that 
associated with FS1.  Note that Figure 1 pertains to one hypothetical food sample and as such both food 
storage activities FS1 and FS2 occur simultaneously, the source being either the same firm or different firms 
in the food safety chain.
As well as the possibility of one or more non-safe activities from the same activity set (FS1 and FS2) there 
can be one or more other non-safe elements across different activities.  For instance FS1 and CH1 may both 
apply.  Clearly, the greater the number of elements that fall outside ‘safe processes’, the higher is PFSI. 
However PFSI is unlikely to rise in a linear fashion as ‘non-safe’ elements are added.  In comparing PFSI for 
FS1 in isolation versus the PFSI for both FS1and CH1 occurring concurrently, the latter PFSI is by definition 
larger but the increase in probability depends on the systematic interactions between the elements.  This is 
analysed further below when the simplifying (and unrealistic) assumptions that we apply of homogeneity in 
the populations of agents and the non-interdependence across activities are removed. 
The schematic framework in Figure 1 can be adapted to allow the determination of standard theoretical 
efficiency conditions, i.e. the equalisation of marginal social cost and marginal social benefit.  Society 
should select food safety provision up to some level where the incremental social costs of achieving a 
higher level are bigger than incremental social benefits.   The social benefit of any form of regulatory 
intervention is the expected avoided costs in terms of morbidity and/or mortality. (For a discussion of this 
literature see Moran et al., 2004).  Thus this expected social benefit is conditioned by the impact that any 
activity has on PFSI. A reduction in PFSI is valuable in that it implies a reduced likelihood of an incident 
arising with the associated costs that must be borne by society. The social cost is the aggregate of the costs 
borne by the regulator, firms and consumers. 
How does this analysis link with the trend towards co-regulation?  Consider Figure 2.  This schematic is a 
characterisation of traditional regulation. Note that whereas Figure 1 is a schematic for the actual activities 
that affect the food safety outcome for one sample of food, Figure 2 represents what should happen vis-à-
vis the activities of firms under traditional regulation. The focus is very much on the behaviour of firms and 
the various activities are regulated accordingly. Regulatory impact assessment is applied so as to allow the designation of a safe minimum standard in these various firm activities. There are various reasons why this 
traditional regulatory framework is economically inefficient which, in part, explain the trend towards co-
regulation. 
Figure 2 Traditional ex ante regulation of firm activity
First, there are no activity points in C for the simple reason that the behaviour of consumers is unregulated. 
This is not an omission or oversight on the part of regulators.  It is the consumer that suffers directly from 
the morbidity and/or mortality associated with foodborne illness.  It is unlikely that consumers would have 
any incentive to willingly self-inflict such illnesses and studies consistently show positive willingness-to 
pay to avoid such illnesses (ibid.).  Thus there is no discrepancy between the preferred outcomes of the 
state and the consumer, i.e. minimising the occurrence and impact of such incidents.  There is thus no need 
for  regulatory  intervention,  even  though  many  of  the  costs  of  such  incidents  are  externalised  by  the 
consumer to the state, e.g. free healthcare provision at point of delivery. The activities of consumers do 
however affect PFSI. Thus alternative mechanisms such as funding of information provision and awareness 
raising  campaigns  may  be  economically  justified  in  that  they  might  achieve  a  given  level  of  social 
benefit/reduction in PFSI at a lower cost than, for instance, further tightening of ex ante regulation of the 
firm.  
A second form of potential inefficiency is the reliance on inflexible command-and-control regulation.  The 
co-regulation agenda promotes more flexible options such as the voluntary adoption of quality assurance 
schemes  instigated  by  individual  firms  or  industry  bodies.  It  is  a  standard  economic  assumption  (e.g. 
Edwards-Jones  et  al.,  2000)  that  providing  incentives  for  private  agents  to  search  for  mechanisms  to 
achieve performance enhancement has a lower associated aggregate social cost than achieving the same 
enhancement through command-and-control. 
The schematic framework presented in this section is useful as it allows a global appraisal of optimality and 
therein supports the contention that conventional ex ante regulation is often less economically efficient than 
alternatives such as co-regulation.  I have stated above that this analysis depends on two sets of conditions.  First, all activity points are independent.  Second, the population of firms and consumers are homogeneous 
with well-defined and consistent objective functions in each case.  In the next section these assumptions are 
relaxed. 
Systemic risk in food safety provision
The food safety outcome, measured as changes in PFSI, depends on the actions and interactions of several 
agents  (both  firms  and  consumers)  in  a  system.    The  assumption  in  the  previous  section  of  non-
interdependency between activity points was applied.  Even under this assumption, if some activity falls 
outside the ‘safe processes’ regions (F, C) then the resultant impact on PFSI depends on what else happens 
in  the  system.  In  the  analysis  that  follows,  the  assumption  of  homogeneous  populations  of  firms  and 
consumers is no longer applied and thus the behavioural assumptions of the sub-populations are set out.  
The interactions between the strategies of these sub-populations then allow the development of a typology 
of systemic risk.
The designation of heterogeneity in the populations of firms and consumers
Consider firm behaviour first.  Assume that, through some process failure, one of the firm’s activity points 
is  outside  F,  i.e.  PFSI>0,  and  that  the  firm  is  aware  of  this.    Consider  a  scenario  where  asymmetric 
information applies between this firm and all other agents in society.  This asymmetric information takes 
the form of this firm knowing (with certainty) that there has been some breakdown in food safety within the 
production  process,  that  firm  not  informing  other  societal  agents,  and  those  agents  not  being  able  to 
determine  with  certainty  any  food  safety  risk.    These  societal  agents  might  include  the  regulator,  the 
consumer and any affected firms, the latter including both those firms that might use the food stuff as an 
input to their own production and distributors/final retailers.  Each agent forms some prior probabilistic assumption that PFSI =0 at the factory gate
1.  Assume that the choice of the firm that has produced the risky 
food is a dichotomous choice, i.e. either disposal of the risky batch or sale. 
The firm’s cost assessment of the ‘sell it’ alternative depends on two  subjective evaluations: first, the 
probability of an outbreak resulting from the food safety breakdown; second, the probability of the cause of 
the outbreak being attributed to the firm.  Assume that this subjective probability is termed .  Further, note 
that Calvin et al. (2004), in a USDA analysis of Hepatitis A outbreak arising from green onions imported 
into  the  US  from  Mexico,  report  that,  until  the  outbreak  occurred,  food  producers  thought  that  the 
probability of an outbreak occurring was lower than was the case in reality.  
The total private penalty to the firm arising from an outbreak occurring and being traced to that firm is the 
sum of three elements.  First, there is the loss in sales revenue and associated profitability that arises from 
the shift in consumer confidence.  Second, there are direct and indirect financial penalties applied by the 
regulator, an example of the latter being the mandatory adoption of a certified quality assurance scheme.  
Third, there may be legal expenses and claims arising from consumer applications of tort liability law and 
breach-of-contract applications by retailers/intermediate purchasers.  All three elements are likely to be 
affected by the extent of the outbreak in terms of morbidity and mortality.
Three distinct sub-populations of firms are characterised based on the manner in which a particular firm 
evaluates  this  dichotomous  choice.    The  first  firm  sub-population  is  termed  FPCSR.    Corporate  social 
responsibility [CSR] is the adoption of an ethical position on social/environmental matters such that the 
firm  chooses  strategies/options  based  on  what  it  perceives  it  ought  to  do  irrespective  of  the  financial 
consequences (Hussain, 1999; Clarkson, 1991).  In the case of food safety, a firm in FPCSR never knowingly
releases any potentially contaminated produce to market even if the source of the outbreak could never be 
traced back to the firm, i.e. even if the firm itself would bear no private costs from any outbreak. The 
second sub-population is termed FPLAW. A firm in this sub-population maximises profits subject to legal 
constraints,  i.e.  it  never  knowingly  contravenes  regulations.    However,  it  might  choose  to  market  the 
                                                          
1 This prior probability is determined by a host of variables including the institutional/legal context, 
reputation-formation, signalling and food labelling etc. These variables and the effects that they have on 
asymmetric information (and the associated potential for market failure) form the core of the discussion 
that follows.   potentially contaminated batch if, say, it could ex post demonstrate due diligence in its actions
2.  The third 
population sub-set is termed FPCHEAT. This constitutes firms that profit-maximise but, unlike those firms in 
FPLAW, choose to abide by regulations if and only if there is sufficient incentive to do so.  For a risk-neutral 
firm in FPCHEAT, the expected cost is  multiplied by the ex ante estimate of total penalties, as discussed 
above. If this expected cost is lower than the benefit  from selling the batch then the  firm in FPCHEAT
markets the contaminated batch.
It is methodologically difficult to estimate the proportion of firms that fall within each of these three sub-
populations. Firms regularly claim CSR credibility but such claims are often difficult to externally verify 
and no firm is likely to admit being in FPCHEAT. Further, a firm might not consistently be in the same sub-
population.  For instance, if the firm perceives (correctly or incorrectly) that a specific regulation is merely 
a ‘red tape’ bureaucratic imposition, it might be tempted to ‘cheat’ whereas it might be responsive (or even 
adopt  a  CSR  stance)  in  other  food  safety  decision-making.  This  provides  a  rationale  for  stakeholder 
consultation in the designation of regulations.  However, Henson and Caswell (1999) note that different 
stakeholders apply divergent criteria both when judging the need for food safety ex ante and the success or 
failure of regulation after implementation.  
Turning to the demand side, three sub-populations for consumers are categorised. CPPROACTIVE is the subset 
of consumers that are proactive in seeking food product information.  They always follow food safety 
instructions  and  warnings  and  feel  that  food  safety  is  in  significant  part  their  personal  responsibility.  
CPREACTIVE is the sub-population of consumers that react to food safety instructions and warnings that are 
clearly labelled on the product itself but do not search for further information.  They feel that food safety 
provision is the responsibility of the  firm and the regulator. The consumers in CPNEGLIGENT neglect or 
disregard food safety instructions or warnings, relying on (potentially risky) cultural norms and traditions in 
their food handling, storage and preparation. A similar caveat applies to the consumer populations as to 
those  of  firms,  i.e.  this  characterisation  is  a  generalisation  and  individuals  may  not  be  coherent  and 
consistent in their decision-making vis-à-vis food safety.
                                                          
2 Note that the legal context of what is permissible firm behaviour varies across OECD nations. Due 
diligence may be a necessary but insufficient condition to avoid prosecution.This typology of the populations allows an investigation of the theoretical possibilities of systemic failure 
arising owing to this heterogeneity in the populations. Hennessy et al. (2003) provides a useful typology of 
systematic  risk  for  food  safety.    The  authors  refer  to  four  types  (A-D)  of  failures  and  I  follow  this 
designation.  I thus use this typology as a starting point but modify it to account for the effect of having 
heterogeneous  sub-populations  of firms and consumers  and  I  then introduce  other  potential sources  of 
systemic market failure that might warrant regulatory intervention.
Systemic failure: system typology and interconnectedness
Failures in Type A occur as a consequence of interconnectedness in the system wherein consequences are 
known (e.g. an outbreak of Salmonella poisoning) but the cause is not isolated. The strategic responses of 
the sub-populations are summarised in Table 1.  Each firm sub-population applies a different strategy to the 
institutional scenario.  FPCSR applies every feasible (and reasonable) effort to ensure that its activities are 
not the source of any such outbreak.  However, the strategies of FPLAW and FPCHEAT are driven by the fact 
that, if traceability is not achieved, then the private cost borne by the offending firm is low relative to the 
aggregate cost to the industry in general and society at large.  Each agent has some ex ante subjective 
probabilistic estimate  of  whether  or  not  the  source  of  the  outbreak  will  the  isolated  ex  post.  A profit 
maximising firm chooses to externalise the costs associated with the food safety risk if it can do so. Since 
the offending firm is part of the food production sector that is responsible for the outbreak, it suffers a 
financial  penalty  from  the  outbreak  as  consumers  lose  confidence  and  switch  consumption  patterns.  
However, these costs are shared across the entire food sector whereas prevention costs are privately borne 
by the firm.  This is a case of market failure.  The difference between the strategies of FPLAW and FPCHEAT
is that the former chooses to always abide by regulation whereas the latter only does so if there is sufficient 
incentive, i.e. the probability and/or the penalty are sufficiently high.
Table 1 Strategic responses to System Failure Type AIn  type  A  system  failure,  only  CPPROACTIVE  might  look  for  certification  to  reduce  the  probability  of 
suffering the private economic costs of consuming contaminated food.  Owing to mixing and the fact that 
certified  alternatives  are  not  available  in  all  food  sectors  that  constitute  the  basket  of  commodities 
consumed by CPPROACTIVE, there is uncertainty.   
In Type A system failure then there is an economic rationale for regulatory intervention.  This is the case 
for the mandatory application of Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) regulations in the US for 
industries that sell raw, unbranded seafood, meat, poultry, along with some fruits and vegetables (Unnevehr 
and Jensen, 1999; Antle, 1998; Caswell and Hooker, 1996).  A Critical Control Point is “any point in the 
chain of food production from raw materials to finished product where the loss of control could result in 
unacceptable food safety risk” (Pierson and Corlett, 1992). This is an example of flexible (and therein more 
efficient, cost-effective) legislation in that the food safety agency provides general requirements in terms of 
food safety outcomes.  It relies on measurable indicators as opposed to the more costly traditional options 
such as product sampling and testing (Unnevehr and Jensen, 1999). For these food product categories, 
traceability  is  limited,  i.e.  it  may  not  be  feasible  to  determine  the  source  producer  responsible  for  a 
foodborne illness incident. Given this, the level of food safety provision selected by FPLAW and FPCHEAT
may be below the social optimum owing to the assumed objective of profit-maximisation. 
Calvin et al. (2004) analyses an incident in the US arising from the consumption of green onions sourced 
from Mexico.  This is an example of the Type A failure in that the incident was traced to one food product 
type from a defined geographical region but not to a particular producer.  The resultant decline in consumer 
confidence and sales is likely to have affected all producers of that product.  The private cost borne by the 
offending firm is a small fraction of the total shared across all Mexican producers of green onions, i.e. an 
instance of market failure in the form of an externality.  This situation is akin to a common property 
resource problem as described in the seminal analysis of Hardin (1968).  The common property resource in 
this case is the ‘consumer perception of food security of (say) Mexican green onions’.  Although each and 
every Mexican producer of green onions might see that this common property resource as valuable, no 
individual private producer has an economic incentive to unilaterally increase the food security of its own 
produce. Hardin (1968) suggests a solution to this in “mutual coercion mutually agreed upon” with an associated  penalty  mechanism  and  there  is  an  extensive  literature  on  common  property  resource 
management (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1994).  Such management is however difficult to implement, monitor and 
enforce  on  a  voluntary  basis.  This  in  turn  implies  that  regulatory  intervention  may  be  economically 
efficient. 
There  is a parallel here also with co-regulation and voluntarism in the food sector.  There  may be an 
adverse selection issue in that those firms that choose voluntarily to improve food safety provision are 
likely to be those that are members of FPCSR or FPLAW but these are not the firms that have the greatest 
impact (all else being equal) on PFSI. If a firm in its activities is close to the frontier of ‘safe processes’ (F), 
the private cost of its adopting some industry standard for a safe minimum standard is likely to be higher 
than that of a firm with established protocols and procedures.  Under voluntarism, the former firm is less 
likely to adopt the standard but it is more likely than the latter to be the source of a foodborne illness 
incident. There is then an economic rationale for regulatory intervention and compulsion.  
Improvements  in  both  traceability  technologies  and  their  applications  potentially  offer  an  alternative 
avenue to internalise the externality and therefore correct the market failure. However, one issue to be 
borne in mind here is the nature of the food sector in terms of market concentration and restrictions on legal 
liability.  If the source of the outbreak is a small producer and/or the source has limited insurance liability 
cover then it might not be possible to fully internalise the social costs of an outbreak.  Further, individuals 
may  not  be  able  or  choose  to  take  the  issue  to  court.    Ex  post  remediation  then  only  has  limited 
effectiveness.  If this is the case then the externality persists even under conditions of perfect traceability.
  
Systemic failure: mistrust in communication
The  second  type  of  systemic  risk  in  the  Hennessy  et  al.  (2003)  typology  is  termed  ‘mistrust  in 
communication’  by  the  authors.    Mistrust of  the  sender  is  linked  to  asymmetric  information.   This  is 
discussed  in  Hussain  (2000)  for  eco-labelling  and  this  has  direct  parallels  for  food  safety  given  the 
heterogeneity in populations.  Any of the three firm types might choose to send a ‘signal’ to potential 
consumers vis-à-vis the food safety of their products.  This signal might be, for instance, the marketing of some quality assurance scheme that the product is accredited under, or the designation of a particular food 
processing technology that has been applied.  The act of sending this signal necessarily incurs some private 
costs to the firm (regardless of the firm type) and thus the firm sends this signal if and only if it the 
expected returns are sufficient to counter-balance these costs
3. Table 2 summarises the strategies of the 
agents in the sub-populations.
Table 2 Strategic responses to System Failure Type B: mistrust of the sender 
The Lancaster-Rosen model of rational consumer decision-making suggests that a consumer forms some 
subjective estimation of the attributes of a product with respect to his/her preferences and then allocates 
his/her budget accordingly (Lancaster, 1966; Lancaster, 1971). CPPROACTIVE and CPREACTIVE may value the 
product attribute of ‘level of food safety’.  If the market functions efficiently, such consumers can signal 
that they value this attribute by making their product selection based in part on their preference for this 
attribute.  The price mechanism then functions in that this signal sent by the consumers stimulates the 
provision of such products by suppliers.  However, note that all three firm subsets are willing to send a 
signal in an attempt to capture this segment of the market.  In the case of FPCSR, any signal sent is never 
intentionally misleading.  (Owing to controversies and incompleteness in the scientific understanding of 
food safety provision, such signals might be found to be inappropriate ex post.)  For FPLAW, a signal is sent 
if  it  is  profitable  to  do  so  and  the  signal/marketing  claim  is  scientifically  defensible.    Given  the 
aforementioned incomplete and imperfect nature of food science, there is then scope (and an associated 
economic  incentive)  for  FPLAW  to  send  a  signal  that  is  misleading  but  not  categorically  scientifically 
incorrect.  FPCHEAT only applies the profit analysis within which is captured an expected penalty from an 
indefensible signal being challenged.        
The potential for a market failure arises in the co-existence of genuine and misleading signals in the context 
of asymmetric information.  Consider a scenario where self-certification labeling coexists in the market 
                                                          
3 We refer here to the marketing costs alone.  The extent of other private costs incurred depends on both the 
nature of the signal being sent and also on the sub-population that the sender is a member of.      with externally accredited labeling.  Assume that, with self-certified labels, the consumer cannot perfectly 
discriminate  between  legitimate  and  illegitimate  food  safety  labels.    This  seems  to  be  a  plausible 
assumption in that the science underpinning such labeling claims can be both complicated and equivocal.  
The consumer must then attribute probabilities that a signal received has been sent by FPCSR, FPLAW or 
FPCHEAT. Assume for exposition that a consumer in CPPROACTIVE assigns a prior probability of 0.6 that the 
signal is legitimate and 0.4 that it is not.  If he or she is willing to pay, say, a £1.00 premium for this 
attribute then, assuming risk neutrality and rationality, this consumer would apply a ‘mixing’ strategy and 
now only pay £0.60 for a product that is signaled as having this attribute. 
There is a potential vicious cycle that might occur, as discussed originally in Akerlof (1970) and in Hussain 
(2000).  It is likely that legitimate increases in the food safety attribute are more costly then illegitimate 
ones.   Assume  that  the cost to  a  FPCSR  firm of providing the incremental increase  in  the  food  safety 
attribute is £0.80 per unit.  Owing to the rational adoption of a mixing strategy by CPPROACTIVE the premium 
paid is only £0.60.  In this case FPCSR decides not to provide this attribute.  Since this is the case, this 
means that a greater proportion of the remaining signals in the market are illegitimate.  If consumers update 
their beliefs vis-à-vis the legitimacy of signals (as they become aware of the fact that FPCSR is no longer 
sending signals), this in turn lowers the premium that CPROACTIVE is willing to pay (to say £0.45) given the 
updated mixing strategy. Those firms that could legitimately offer the attribute at £0.55 now withdraw from 
the market.
What this analysis implies is that there can be an economically valid case for intervention to monitor self-
certification  in  the  food  safety  domain  or  indeed  to  apply  more  stringent  ex  ante  legislation  such  as 
requiring that all such claims be externally certified.  If the latter applies then CPPROACTIVE no longer need 
apply a mixing strategy.  Although such intervention upon initial inspection might appear to be overly 
interventionist and non-market in nature, it might in fact be necessary to allow market operations and the 
price  mechanism to  operate  efficiently.  In essence  this is  again an argument  against voluntarism,  i.e. 
allowing firms do decide whether or not to legitimate food safety claims through third party verification.
Such intervention will not be appropriate in all cases however.  Both proposed measures have implied 
transactions costs.  If the scale of the inefficiency that arises from asymmetric information and the need for consumers to apply a mixing strategy is small then regulatory change might not be justified in economic 
terms.
One feature of the food sector in the UK is the relative dominance of supermarket chains own brand sales 
in food provision (Henson and Traill, 1993).  In terms of food safety signals, a common denominator for all 
three subsets of the population of firms is that expected profitability from signaling would need to be 
positive.  There are two features of supermarkets that imply that illegitimate signals are unlikely to be sent.  
First, the scale of these organisations implies that corporate liability in the event of ex post scientific proof 
that  food  safety  claims  were  inappropriate  is  potentially  enormous.  Second,  consumers  are  likely  to 
associate food safety failures with not just one particular product in the supermarket’s own label brand but 
the entire brand itself.  This knock-on effect serves as a countervailing force against the tendency in FPLAW
and FPCHEAT profit-maximising firms to send illegitimate signals.  Reputation formation is cited by Buzby 
and Frenzen (1999) as a possible reason why large franchises are more likely than most other defendants to 
settle any legal challenges out of court and therefore away from public scrutiny.                
Systemic failure: asymmetric information leading to co-ordination failure and distorted incentives
Whereas  Type  B  systemic  failures  occur  owing  to  information  asymmetries  across  populations 
(firm/consumer),  Type  C  failures  in  the  Hennessy  et  al.  (2003)  typology  refer  systemic  to  inter-firm
asymmetries. For exposition, assume that there are two firms, Firm A and Firm B, which are participants in 
the production of a particular food commodity for sale to the consumer. Firm A is ‘upstream’ of Firm B, i.e. 
the former provides an input to the latter. Assume further that Firm B is considering the implementation of 
a food safety measure (which incurs a private cost to Firm B) but that the effectiveness of this measure 
depends not only on its activity points (handling, processing etc.) but also those of Firm A.  Firm B does not 
know  with  certainty  which  population  sub-set  (i.e.  FPCSR;  FPLAW;  FPCHEAT)  Firm  A  is  a  member  of.  
Similarly to the Type B failure, Firm B plays a mixing strategy with the associated potential economic 
inefficiencies that are implied. In a similar fashion to Type B failure, adverse selection issues can imply 
that voluntarism leads to an economically inefficient outcome.  A form of regulatory intervention to address Type C failure is external accreditation, but whether or not it is 
economically efficient to enforce accreditation depends on the appraisal of costs and benefits.  This type of 
systemic  failure  is  perhaps  less  of  an  empirical  issue  in  that  Firm  B  has  an  incentive  to  preserve  the 
credibility of its brand and to avoid the liability/penalties arising from any food safety incident that might 
arise.  There is a strong private incentive to instigate ‘supplier challenges’ to make the demonstration of 
food safety compliance a necessary condition of being a supplier. 
Systemic failure: Failure to develop state-conditioned technologies
Type D in the Hennessy et al. (2003) typology does not arise as a consequence of the structure of the 
system or incentives therein.  It arises owing to the fact the food safety technologies might not be able to 
adapt  to  deal  with  all  potential  ‘states  of  nature’  or  outcomes.  Although  the  link  is  not  drawn  out  in 
Hennessy et al. (2003), there are parallels  with the economics of  ‘network externalities’ discussed  for 
environmental technologies Hussain (2003). Conventional economic theory suggests that, if the market is 
functioning efficiently,  firms have an incentive to  search for technological improvements that increase 
private profitability.  In the realm of food safety, this implies that, were a technique or technology to lead to 
efficiency  gains  then  the  market  would  stimulate  its  development  and  application.    The  evolutionary 
economic models of Nelson-Winter (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1977; Nelson and Winter, 1982) suggest that 
the technology trajectory is ‘path dependent’.  If firms have had a history of searching for and selecting 
technologies  in  a  certain  domain  then  they  are  likely  to  choose  to  pursue  R&D  options  close  to  this 
trajectory.  However, it is quite possible that this implies that certain technologies remain underdeveloped 
as a consequence, technologies that might actually be more efficient than those that are developed: this is 
where the network externality arises from. There may then be the need to stimulate not just incremental 
technological steps in the R&D of food safety but fundamental paradigm shifts. 
.  Systemic failure: dependence between activity points
I would suggest the addition of a further potential source of systemic failure that arises either owing to 
inappropriate ex ante assumptions with respect to how the behaviour of one agent affects that of another, or 
cases where no inter-dependence is assumed but actually occurs in practice. There is evidence from the 
literature on the economics of risk that such inter-dependence can lead to sub-optimal outcomes.  Further, I 
would suggest that this might apply in the food safety domain as well.  
Analysis by Peltzman (1975) demonstrates that the introduction of seatbelts as a safety feature to reduce the 
risk of morbidity/mortality arising from a car accident resulted in a shift in consumer behaviour in that 
drivers took more risks ex post.  Similarly, Viscusi (1984) considers the mandatory application of child-
resistant bottle caps on medicine bottles.  This research shows that the number of incidents of accidents in 
the  home  arising  from  children  consuming  medication  without  parental  awareness/consent  actually 
increased ex post.  Viscusi suggests that this occurred because parents adopted a more risky strategy than 
they had prior to the regulation, i.e. some no longer took the caution of keeping the medication out of the 
reach of their children.
Both these cases are examples of bilateral damage control wherein one agent’s effort affects the marginal 
effectiveness of the other agent’s effort.  Roe (2004) argues that, for most foodborne illness occurring in the 
home, consumers can alter the damage outcome by altering the preventative effort taken in response to 
information concerning the industry’s level of preventative effort.  Shogren and Crocker (1999) refer to this 
as endogenous risk. 
Figure 3 Endogenous risk
Endogenous  risk  can  be  conceptualised  using  the  schematic  framework  that  was  developed  above.  
Consider Figure 3.  Assume that there is a regulatory change that requires that the product packaging for 
uncooked poultry be changed so as reduce the risk of raw meat juices leaking from the packaging and 
therein cross-contaminating other cooked produce.  This mandatory change reduces the likelihood of food contamination in storage and distribution and thus the relevant activity points shift from FS1 to FS2 and FD1
to  FD2.    Such  a  shift  might  be  expected  to  realise  no  change  in  the  activity  points  of  the  consumer.  
However, in the same vein as consumers’ reactions to ‘safer’ paracetamol packaging (Viscusi, 1984), some 
proportion of consumers of poultry (in CPREACT and CPNEGLIGENT) might adapt their behaviour and therein 
cause an outward shift in the storage activity from CS1 to CS2 and in handling from CH1 to CH2.  Although 
CS2 and CH2 are depicted in Figure 3 as being safe, i.e. in C and F respectively, there may be cases where 
this does not apply.  The conceivable net effect of the regulation might be an increase in PFSI., and therefore 
of course be inefficient in that there is likely to be a positive marginal cost associated with the ‘safer’ 
packaging. 
Summary and policy recommendations: a screening procedure 
Consumers  and firms  are  often treated  as agents that respond consistently and  rationally to  regulatory 
interventions.  In the designation of optimal regulation, it is often assumed that firms aim to maximise 
private profitability within the confines of the law and consumers to maximise private utility subject to the 
constraints of the market. Under the typology developed, the assumption then is that firms are all FPLAW
and consumers are all CPREACTIVE.  The analysis presented is based on the premises that the populations of 
firms and consumers are in fact heterogeneous and that there is strategic interaction between the agents. 
Other subsets of the firm and consumer populations have been defined, viz. FPCSR, FPCHEAT, CPPROACTIVE, 
and CPNEGLIGENT.   
The food safety outcome then depends not only on the behaviour of each agent in isolation but on the 
actions and strategies of a group of agents.  This group comprises firms and consumers that select activities 
that affect food safety.  These activities can be grouped as raw material selection, processing, storage, 
handling, distribution, storage and preparation.  If any activity is located outside the region termed ‘safe 
processes’  then  the  probability  PFSI  that  a  food  safety  arises  is  strictly  positive.    The  assumed  global 
objective function of the regulator is to determine the economically efficient level of PFSI. This is achieved 
by counter-balancing at the margin the expected costs of an incident occurring (in terms of the value of 
morbidity and/or mortality) and the prevention costs. There  are  many different  mechanisms  for reducing  the  incidence  of  unsafe processes, i.e.  of reducing 
probability PFSI. Each of the aforementioned activities that affect the food safety outcome has an associated 
likelihood of falling out with ‘safe processes’ owing to stochastic or systematic breakdowns in food safety 
procedures.  In turn,  there  is  some  cost associated  with  reducing this  likelihood  for each  activity.    A 
necessary condition for economic efficiency is probability PFSI is reduced at least cost by surveying and
appraising options vis-à-vis these activities. This is perhaps the rationale for co-regulation.  I accept the 
argument that the traditional regulatory focus on rigid, inflexible legislation targeting only firm activities is 
unlikely  to  be  efficient.  But  I  also  argue  that  a  shift  towards  voluntarism  should  be  tempered  by  an 
appraisal of the strategic interactions between agents.  There are various types of systemic market failure 
that may occur.
The first occurs when the consequences of the actions of the various agents that determine the food safety 
outcome are known but the cause is not isolated to one agent, or similarly when the cause is known but 
mixing occurs.  There  can be  an incentive  for FPCHEAT to  ‘externalise’ the costs of food safety if the 
probability  of  being  caught  and  the  associated  penalty  are  insufficiently  high.    Forms  of  regulatory 
intervention include increasing traceability and/or making compliance with food safety systems mandatory, 
and providing a sufficient incentive for FPCHEAT to comply.   
A second potential market failure occurs if there is potential for mistrust of a firm sending a food safety 
message  as  the  recipient  cannot  determine  with  certainty  the  legitimacy  of  otherwise  of  the  message 
received.  Forms of regulatory intervention include expending greater resources on monitoring self-certified 
signals  or  requiring  that  all  signals  be  externally  accredited.  An  alternative  might  be  to  change  the 
institutional context of firm decision-making by adapting tort and liability laws.     
A third failure is a potential ‘network externality’ effect.  This arises as the private ‘searches’ carried out by 
agents to find improvements in food safety technologies and techniques might be incremental in nature.  
This  process  of  ‘searching’  and  ‘selecting’  innovation  options  might  preclude  a  more  fundamental 
paradigm shift in behaviour that might lead to a more globally efficient solution.  Such a paradigm shift 
may need to be identified and stimulated through state intervention.               If there is the potential for market failure, this does not mean that the aforementioned forms of regulatory 
intervention as corrective measures are necessarily economically efficient. In each case, the marginal social 
costs  and  marginal  social  benefits  would  need  to  be  determined.  What  I  contend  however  is  that  the 
argument that voluntarism and co-regulation are inherently efficient alternatives may be flawed. 
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Analgesic Ingestions.  American Economic Review 74, 324-327.Figure 1 A schematic representation of food security Figure 2 Ex ante regulation of firm activityFigure 3 Endogenous riskAgent Strategy
Type A: consequences known but cause not isolated; cause is known but mixing 
occurs
FPCSR Applies every reasonable effort to avoid being the source of such an outbreak
FPLAW Applies any effort that is either mandated by law for compliance purposes or is 
justified by profit estimates 
FPCHEAT Prefers to ‘externalise’ the costs associated with risky food safety practices; only 
applies effort/incurs cost if the perceived probability of suffering direct financial 
penalty (through traceability) is sufficiently high
CPPROACTIVE Searches for foodstuffs that are certified as being above compliance, e.g. quality 
assured 
CPREACTIVE Assumes that regulation is adequate to ensure that food safety measures to combat 
this type of potential systematic failure are in place
CPNEGLIGENT Assumes that regulation is adequate to ensure that food safety measures to combat 
this type of potential systematic failure are in place
REGULATOR Increase traceability and/or make compliance with food safety systems mandatory; 
sufficient penalty to provide private incentive for FPCHEAT to comply 
Table 1 Strategic responses to System Failure Type A Agent Strategy
Type B: mistrust of the sender
FPCSR Only ever sends signal that it believes it to be legitimate and informative
FPLAW Sends signal if it is profitable to do so and scientifically defensible 
FPCHEAT Sends signal if it is profitable
CPPROACTIVE Actively searches for legitimate signal and might pay price premium 
CPREACTIVE Might respond to signal depending on preferences
CPNEGLIGENT Any signal sent has little or no effect on purchasing behaviour
REGULATOR Potential economically legitimate intervention to expend greater resources on 
monitoring self-certified signals or to require all signals to be externally 
accredited
Table 2 Strategic responses to System Failure Type B: mistrust of the sender 